Honeypot network services

ABSTRACT

In general, in one aspect, a system for providing honeypot network services may monitor network activity, and detect network activity indicative of network service discovery by a first device, for example, port scanning. The system may present a temporarily available network service to the first device in response to detecting the activity indicative of port scanning, for example, by redirecting traffic at an unassigned network address to a honeypot network service. The system may monitor communication between the first device and the presented honeypot network service to determine whether the monitored communication is indicative of a threat, and determine that the first device is compromised based on the monitored communication between the first device and the presented honeypot network service. The system may initiate measures to protect the network from the compromised first device.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates to computer network security and to detectingcomputer network intrusion.

BACKGROUND

In order to intrude into a system or to start an attack (e.g., a denialof service attack), attackers attempt to determine information aboutnetwork services available on a network in order to take advantage ofsecurity deficiencies of these network services. For example, networkservices using the TCP and UDP Internet protocols can be accessed viaspecific ports and the port assignment is generally known, for examplethe SMTP service generally is assigned to the TCP Port 25. Ports thatprovide network services on a network device may be referred to as“open,” since it is possible to establish a connection to the networkservice, whereas unused ports are referred to as “closed,” sinceattempts to connect with them will fail.

An attacker with access to a network may attempt to find open ports withthe help of a particular software tool, referred to as a port scanner. Aport scanner program tries to connect with several ports on thedestination computer. If it is successful, the tool displays therelevant ports as open and the attacker obtains potentially usefulinformation, showing which network services are available on thedestination computer. There are currently 65535 distinct and usable portnumbers for the TCP and UDP Internet protocols, and so the ports aretypically scanned at very short intervals.

A conventional network monitor may detect an unusually large number ofattempts to connect to services from the same source address as a portscan. When a port scan is detected, an action may be taken such aslogging the scan, dropping packets from the port scanning device, orrejecting packets from the port scanning device. Thus, further port scanactivity from the same source address may be blocked. In each case,there is the possibility of false positives, which would create problemsfor applications and users who have a legitimate need to conduct networkactivity that triggers conventional port scan detection.

SUMMARY

In some implementations, a network device may be suspected of compromisebased on detected network activity of the network device, alone or incombination with other devices. The network activity may include, forexample, access of network addresses or ports known to be unassignednetwork addresses or unused ports. When a network device is suspected ofcompromise, honeypot network services may be made available temporarily(e.g., for a limited time) to the suspected device and in some casesonly to the suspected network device and any other suspected networkdevices. Communication between the suspected network device and thehoneypot network services are monitored, and based on the monitoredcommunication the suspected network device may be convicted ascompromised. Steps may be initiated to protect the network from thecompromised device, including isolating the compromised device or thecompromised application, and remediating the compromise.

For example, a honeypot network service may be made available tosuspected devices at a previously unassigned network address. The samehoneypot network service may be made available at a number of previouslyunassigned network addresses.

In some implementations, a trigger for suspecting a device of compromisemay be more sensitive than conventional port scanning detection, becausethe network device is first suspected based on network service discoverynetwork activity, and then convicted based on interaction with ahoneypot network service. At the same time, presenting honeypot networkservice(s) only to suspected network device(s) minimizes disturbance tousers of the network.

In general, in one aspect, a system for detecting a compromised deviceincludes a processor and a memory comprising instructions executable bythe processor, the instructions when executed causing the processor todetect network activity indicative of network service discovery by afirst device.

In some implementations, detecting network service discovery may beperformed by detecting a number of network requests to different portsin a period of time. In some implementations, detecting network servicediscovery may be performed by detecting a number of network requests toa specific port at two or more different network addresses. In someimplementations, detecting network service discovery may be performed bydetecting a first network request to a first port associated with anunassigned network address and a second network request to a second portat the unassigned network address. In some implementations, detectingnetwork service discovery may be performed by detecting a plurality ofnetwork requests to unassigned network addresses or ports.

In response to detecting the activity indicative of network servicediscovery, the system may present a target network service to the firstdevice.

In some implementations, the target network service is a honeypotnetwork service. The target network service may be presented byconfiguring a network device to respond to requests at a particularnetwork address. The network address may have been previouslyunassigned. The target network service may be presented by redirectingtraffic at an unassigned network address to a honeypot network service.In some implementations, the target network service may be presentedsimultaneously at two or more network addresses. In someimplementations, the target network service may be presented only todevices that are suspected of compromise based on detected activityindicative of network service discovery.

The system may monitor communication between the first device and thepresented network service. The system may determine that the firstdevice is compromised based on the monitored communication between thefirst device and the presented network service. The system may determinethat the first device is compromised based on interaction between thefirst device and the presented network service.

Having determined that the first device is compromised, the system mayprotect the network from the compromised first device. The system mayprotect the network by preventing communication from the first device tothe network. The system may protect the network by notifying a threatdetection facility that the first device is compromised. The system mayprotect the network by identifying a process on the first device thatgenerated the detected network activity. The system may protect thenetwork by pausing or terminating the process or application on thefirst device that generated the detected network activity. The systemmay protect the network by isolating the process or application on thefirst device that generated the detected network activity.

In general, in one aspect, a non-transitory computer-readable mediumincludes instructions executable by a processor for detecting acompromised device on a network, the instructions when executed causethe processor to monitor network activity and detect network activityindicative of network service discovery by a first device. Theinstructions when executed may cause the processor to present atemporarily available network service to the first device in response todetecting the activity indicative of port scanning. The instructionswhen executed may further cause the processor to monitor communicationbetween the first device and the presented honeypot network service todetermine whether the monitored communication is indicative of a threat.The instructions when executed may further cause the processor todetermine that the first device is compromised based on the monitoredcommunication between the first device and the presented honeypotnetwork service. The instructions when executed may further cause theprocessor to initiate measures to protect the network from thecompromised first device.

In some implementations, detecting network service discovery may beperformed by detecting a number of network requests to different portsin a period of time. In some implementations, detecting network servicediscovery may be performed by detecting a number of network requests toa specific port at two or more different network addresses. In someimplementations, detecting network service discovery may be performed bydetecting a first network request to a first port associated with anunassigned network address and a second network request to a second portat the unassigned network address. In some implementations, detectingnetwork service discovery may be performed by detecting a plurality ofnetwork requests to unassigned network addresses or ports.

In some implementations, the honeypot network service may be presentedby configuring a network device to respond to requests at a particularnetwork address. The network address may have been previouslyunassigned. The honeypot network service may be presented by redirectingtraffic at an unassigned network address to a honeypot network service.In some implementations, the honeypot network service may be presentedsimultaneously at two or more network addresses. In someimplementations, the honeypot network service may be presented only todevices that are suspected of compromise based on detected activityindicative of network service discovery. The honeypot network servicemay be presented for a predetermined period of time.

In some implementations, the measures to protect the network may includepreventing communication from the first device to the network. Themeasures to protect the network may include isolating the first devicefrom communication with the network. In some implementations, themeasures to protect the network may include notifying a threat detectionfacility that the first device is compromised. In some implementations,the measures to protect the network may include generating an alertabout the compromised first device. The measures to protect the networkmay include identifying a process on the first device that generated thedetected network activity. The measures to protect the network mayinclude pausing or terminating the process or application on the firstdevice that generated the detected network activity. The measures toprotect the network may include isolating the process or application onthe first device that generated the detected network activity.

In general, in some aspects, a method for detecting a compromised deviceon a network may include detecting network activity indicative ofnetwork service discovery by a first device. The method may includepresenting a network service to the first device in response todetecting the activity indicative of network service discovery. Themethod may include monitoring communication between the first device andthe presented network service. The method may include determining thatthe first device is compromised based on the monitored communicationbetween the first device and the presented network service. The methodmay include protecting the network from the compromised first device.

In some implementations, detecting network service discovery may beperformed by detecting a number of network requests to different portsin a period of time. In some implementations, detecting network servicediscovery may be performed by detecting a number of network requests toa specific port at two or more different network addresses. In someimplementations, detecting network service discovery may be performed bydetecting a first network request to a first port associated with anunassigned network address and a second network request to a second portat the unassigned network address. In some implementations, detectingnetwork service discovery may be performed by detecting a plurality ofnetwork requests to unassigned network addresses or ports.

In some implementations, the presented network service is not accessibleby the first device prior to the presenting. In some implementations,the presented network service is accessible only by the first device. Insome implementations, the presented network service is a honeypotnetwork service. In some implementations, the presented network servicemay be presented by configuring a network device to respond to requestsat a particular network address. The network address may have beenpreviously unassigned. The presented network service may be presented byredirecting traffic at an unassigned network address to the presentednetwork service. In some implementations, the presented network servicemay be presented simultaneously at two or more network addresses. Insome implementations, the presented network service may be presentedonly to devices that are suspected of compromise based on detectedactivity indicative of network service discovery. In someimplementations, the presented network service is accessible to thefirst device and its local network. The presented network service may bepresented for a predetermined period of time.

In some implementations, the measures to protect the network may includepreventing communication from the first device to the network. Themeasures to protect the network may include isolating the first devicefrom communication with the network. In some implementations, themeasures to protect the network may include notifying a threat detectionfacility that the first device is compromised. In some implementations,the measures to protect the network may include generating an alertabout the compromised first device. The measures to protect the networkmay include identifying a process on the first device that generated thedetected network activity. The measures to protect the network mayinclude pausing or terminating the process or application on the firstdevice that generated the detected network activity. The measures toprotect the network may include isolating the process or application onthe first device that generated the detected network activity.

In some implementations, the network service is presented by making thenetwork service available at a previously unassigned network address. Insome implementations, the network service is presented by forwardingtraffic directed to an unassigned network address to a network device.In some implementations, the activity indicative of network servicediscovery comprises port scanning. In some implementations, detectingnetwork activity indicative of network service discovery comprisesdetecting a request to a network service at an unassigned networkaddress. In some implementations, detecting network activity indicativeof network service discovery comprises detecting a plurality of requeststo a network service at different ports associated with an unassignednetwork address. In some implementations, the request to the networkservice is made to a predetermined port of an unassigned networkaddress. In some implementations, the method also includes detecting asecond network request to a second port at a different unassignednetwork address.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the devices,systems, and methods described herein will be apparent from thefollowing description of particular embodiments thereof, as illustratedin the accompanying drawings. The drawings are not necessarily to scale,emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of thedevices, systems, and methods described herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management according tosome implementations.

FIG. 2 illustrates a network system according to some implementations.

FIG. 3 illustrates a method for detecting a compromised device on anetwork according to some implementations.

FIG. 4 illustrates an implementation in an exemplary network.

FIG. 5 illustrates a list of network addresses for the exemplary networkof FIG. 4.

FIG. 6 illustrates a demonstrative example of network requests in animplementation.

FIG. 7 illustrates an implementation of a system for providing honeypotnetwork services.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanyingfigures, in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may,however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construedas limited to the illustrated embodiments set forth herein.

All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference intheir entirety. References to items in the singular should be understoodto include items in the plural, and vice versa, unless explicitly statedotherwise or clear from the context. Grammatical conjunctions areintended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive combinationsof conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwisestated or clear from the context. Thus, the term “or” should generallybe understood to mean “and/or” and so forth.

Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,referring instead individually to any and all values falling within therange, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value withinsuch a range is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. The words “about,” “approximately,” or thelike, when accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed asindicating a deviation as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skillin the art to operate satisfactorily for an intended purpose. Ranges ofvalues and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only, anddo not constitute a limitation on the scope of the describedembodiments. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language(“e.g.,” “such as,” or the like) provided herein, is intended merely tobetter illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on thescope of the embodiments or the claims. No language in the specificationshould be construed as indicating any unclaimed element as essential tothe practice of the embodiments.

In the following description, it is understood that terms such as“first,” “second,” “third,” “above,” “below,” and the like, are words ofconvenience and are not to be construed as limiting terms unlessexpressly state otherwise.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats—a context inwhich the following techniques may usefully be deployed. One aspectrelates to corporate policy management and implementation through aunified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in moredetail below, a threat management facility 100 may be used to protectcomputer assets from many threats, both computer-generated threats anduser-generated threats. The threat management facility 100 may bemulti-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assetsfrom a variety of threats and it may be adapted to learn about threatsin one dimension (e.g. worm detection) and apply the knowledge inanother dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy management is one of thedimensions for which the threat management facility can provide acontrol capability. A corporation or other entity may institute a policythat prevents certain people (e.g. employees, groups of employees, typesof employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from accessing certaintypes of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect toprevent its accounting department from using a particular version of aninstant messaging service or all such services. In this example, thepolicy management facility 112 may be used to update the policies of allcorporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or itmay update a select few. By using the threat management facility 100 tofacilitate the setting, updating and control of such policies thecorporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threatmanagement facility 100 up to date on such policies. The threatmanagement facility 100 can take care of updating all of the othercorporate computing assets.

It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 mayprovide multiple services, and policy management may be offered as oneof the services. We will now turn to a description of certaincapabilities and components of the threat management system 100.

Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across theInternet 154. From both a technical perspective and a user perspective,the categorization of a specific threat type, whether as virus, worm,spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or the like, is becomingreduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,may need to be stopped at various points of a networked computingenvironment, such as one of an enterprise facility 102, including at oneor more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways, communication ports,handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, theremay be less and less benefit to the user in having different solutionsfor known and unknown threats. As such, a consolidated threat managementfacility 100 may need to apply a similar set of technologies andcapabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide a single agent on the desktop, and asingle scan of any suspect file. This approach may eliminate theinevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating virusesand spyware as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifyingadministration and minimizing desktop load. As the number and range oftypes of threats has increased, so may have the level of connectivityavailable to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase in thespeed at which threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected tothe Internet 154 may be infected quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes)which may require acceleration for the delivery of threat protection.Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threatmanagement facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update itsproduct set against spam and virus threats quickly, for instance, everyfive minutes, every minute, continuously, or the like. Analysis andtesting may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed morefrequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may doso without compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 mayalso extend techniques that may have been developed for virus andmalware protection, and provide them to enterprise facility 102 networkadministrators to better control their environments. In addition tostopping malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may providepolicy management that may be able to control legitimate applications,such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and thelike, that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102.

The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility102 protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware,adware, Trojans, intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, andthe like, where the enterprise facility 102 may be any entity with anetworked computer-based infrastructure. In an embodiment, FIG. 1 maydepict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats. Theenterprise facility 102 may be corporate, commercial, educational,governmental, or the like, and the enterprise facility's 102 computernetwork may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in aplurality of geographical locations, and may include administration 134,a firewall 138A, an appliance 140A, server 142A, network devices 148A-B,clients 144A-D, such as protected by computer security facilities 152,and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein to clientfacilities may include the clients 144A-D shown in FIG. 1 andvice-versa. The threat management facility 100 may include a pluralityof functions, such as security management facility 122, policymanagement facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,network access rules facility 124, remedial action facility 128,detection techniques facility 130, testing facility 118, threat researchfacility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat protectionprovided by the threat management facility 100 may extend beyond thenetwork boundaries of the enterprise facility 102 to include clients144D (or client facilities) that have moved into network connectivitynot directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility 102.Threats to client facilities may come from a plurality of sources, suchas from network threats 104, physical proximity threats 110, secondarylocation threats 108, and the like. Clients 144A-D may be protected fromthreats even when the client 144A-D is not located in association withthe enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E-F moves in and out of theenterprise facility 102, for example when interfacing with anunprotected server 142C through the Internet 154, when a client 144F ismoving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing withcomponents 140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide anenterprise facility 102 protection from a plurality of threats tomultiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and networkconfigurations, with an integrated system approach.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as astand-alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat managementfacility 100 may be integrated into a third-party product. Anapplication programming interface (e.g. a source code interface) may beprovided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.For instance, the threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone inthat it provides direct threat protection to an enterprise or computerresource, where protection is subscribed to directly 100. Alternatively,the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly,through a third-party product, where an enterprise may subscribe toservices through the third-party product, and threat protection to theenterprise may be provided by the threat management facility 100 throughthe third-party product.

The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of elementsthat provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computerresources, including endpoint security and control, email security andcontrol, web security and control, reputation-based filtering, controlof unauthorized users, control of guest and non-compliant computers, andthe like. The security management facility 122 may be a softwareapplication that may provide malicious code and malicious applicationprotection to a client facility computing resource. The securitymanagement facility 122 may have the ability to scan the client facilityfiles for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications andfiles, prevent certain actions, perform remedial actions and performother security measures. In embodiments, scanning the client facilitymay include scanning some or all of the files stored to the clientfacility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when theapplication is executed, scanning files as the files are transmitted toor from the client facility, or the like. The scanning of theapplications and files may be performed to detect known malicious codeor known unwanted applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code andunwanted applications may be continually developed and distributed, andupdates to the known code database may be provided on a periodic basis,on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.

In an embodiment, the security management facility 122 may provide foremail security and control, where security management may help toeliminate spam, viruses, spyware and phishing, control of email content,and the like. The security management facility's 122 email security andcontrol may protect against inbound and outbound threats, protect emailinfrastructure, prevent data leakage, provide spam filtering, and thelike. In an embodiment, security management facility 122 may provide forweb security and control, where security management may help to detector block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help controlweb browsing, and the like, which may provide comprehensive web accesscontrol enabling safe, productive web browsing. Web security and controlmay provide Internet use policies, reporting on suspect devices,security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,URI filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, the security managementfacility 122 may provide for network access control, which may providecontrol over network connections. Network control may stop unauthorized,guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may controlnetwork traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. Inaddition, network access control may control access to virtual privatenetworks (VPN), where VPNs may be a communications network tunneledthrough another network, establishing a logical connection acting as avirtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same manneras a physical network.

In an embodiment, the security management facility 122 may provide forhost intrusion prevention through behavioral based protection, which mayguard against unknown threats by analyzing behavior before software codeexecutes. Behavioral based protection may monitor code when it runs andintervene if the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious.Advantages of behavioral based protection over runtime protection mayinclude code being prevented from running. Whereas runtime protectionmay only interrupt code that has already partly executed, behavioralprotection can identify malicious code at the gateway or on the fileservers and delete the code before it can reach endpoint computers andthe like.

In an embodiment, the security management facility 122 may provide forreputation filtering, which may target or identify sources of knownmalware. For instance, reputation filtering may include lists of URIs ofknown sources of malware or known suspicious IP addresses, or domains,say for spam, that when detected may invoke an action by the threatmanagement facility 100, such as dropping them immediately. By droppingthe source before any interaction can initiate, potential threat sourcesmay be thwarted before any exchange of data can be made.

In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to athird party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improvedperformance of the threat management facility 100. For example, thetypes, times, and number of virus interactions that a client experiencesmay provide useful information for the preventions of future virusthreats. This type of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threatdetection. Feedback of information may also be associated with behaviorsof individuals within the enterprise, such as being associated with mostcommon violations of policy, network access, unauthorized applicationloading, unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments,this type of information feedback may enable the evaluation or profilingof client actions that are violations of policy that may provide apredictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.

In an embodiment, the security management facility 122 may provide forthe overall security of the enterprise facility 102 network or set ofenterprise facility 102 networks, may provide updates of malicious codeinformation to the enterprise facility 102 network, and associatedclient facilities. The updates may include a planned update, an updatein reaction to a threat notice, an update in reaction to a request foran update, an update based on a search of known malicious codeinformation, or the like. The administration facility 134 may providecontrol over the security management facility 122 when updates areperformed. The updates may be automatically transmitted without anadministration facility's 134 direct control, manually transmitted bythe administration facility 134, or the like. The security managementfacility 122 may include the management of receiving malicious codedescriptions from a provider, distribution of malicious codedescriptions to enterprise facility 102 networks, distribution ofmalicious code descriptions to client facilities, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy managementfacility 112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, suchas VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like,that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102. The policy management facility 112 may be a setof rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 accesspermissions for the client facility, such as access permissionsassociated with the network, applications, external computer devices,and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a database,a text file, a combination of databases and text files, or the like. Inan embodiment, a policy database may be a block list, a black list, anallowed list, a white list, or the like that may provide a list ofenterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that mayor may not be accessed by the client facility. The policy managementfacility 112 may include rules that may be interpreted with respect toan enterprise facility 102 network access request to determine if therequest should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for thetype of access that may be granted. The rules may be related to thepolicies of an enterprise facility 102 for access rights for theenterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be arule that does not permit access to sporting websites. When a website isrequested by the client facility, a security facility may access therules within a policy facility to determine if the requested access isrelated to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facilitymay analyze the requested website to determine if the website matcheswith any of the policy facility rules.

The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the securitymanagement facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102wide access rules and policies that may be distributed to maintaincontrol of client facility access to enterprise facility 102 networkresources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset ofapplication capabilities, organization hierarchy, computer facilitytype, user type, network location, time of day, connection type, or thelike. Policies may be maintained by the administration facility 134,through the threat management facility 100, in association with a thirdparty, or the like. For example, a policy may restrict IM activity toonly support personnel for communicating with customers. This may allowcommunication for departments requiring access, but may maintain thenetwork bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM toonly the personnel that need access to instant messaging (IM) in supportof the enterprise facility 102. In an embodiment, the policy managementfacility 112 may be a stand-alone application, may be part of thenetwork server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102network, may be part of the client facility, or the like.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provideconfiguration management, which may be similar to policy management, butmay specifically examine the configuration set of applications,operating systems, hardware, and the like, and manage changes to theirconfigurations. Assessment of a configuration may be made against astandard configuration policy, detection of configuration changes,remediation of improper configuration, application of newconfigurations, and the like. An enterprise may keep a set of standardconfiguration rules and policies which may represent the desired stateof the device. For example, a client firewall may be running andinstalled, but in the disabled state, where remediation may be to enablethe firewall. In another example, the enterprise may set a rule thatdisallows the use of USB disks, and sends a configuration change to allclients, which turns off USB drive access via a registry.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may also provide forthe removal of applications that may interfere with the operation of thethreat management facility 100, such as competitor products that mayalso be attempting similar threat management functions. The removal ofsuch products may be initiated automatically whenever such products aredetected. In the case where such applications are services are providedindirectly through a third-party product, the application may besuspended until action is taken to remove or disable the third-partyproduct's protection facility.

Threat management against a sometimes quickly evolving malwareenvironment may require timely updates, and thus an update managementfacility 120 may be provided by the threat management facility 100. Inaddition, a policy management facility 112 may also require updatemanagement (e.g., as provided by the update facility 120 hereindescribed). The update management for the security facility 122 andpolicy management facility 112 may be provided directly by the threatmanagement facility 100, such as by a hosted system or in conjunctionwith the administration facility 134. In embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide for patch management, where a patchmay be an update to an operating system, an application, a system tool,or the like, where one of the reasons for the patch is to reducevulnerability to threats.

In embodiments, the security facility 122 and policy management facility112 may push information to the enterprise facility 102 network and/orclient facility, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility may pull information from the security facility 122 and policymanagement facility 112 network server facilities 142, there may be acombination of pushing and pulling of information between the securityfacility 122 and the policy management facility 112 network servers 142,enterprise facility 102 network, and client facilities, or the like. Forexample, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility maypull information from the security facility 122 and policy managementfacility 112 network server facility 142 may request the informationusing the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112update module; the request may be based on a certain time period, by acertain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In another example, thesecurity facility 122 and policy management facility 112 network servers142 may push the information to the enterprise facility's 102 networkand/or client facility by providing notification that there are updatesavailable for download and then transmitting the information. Thecombination of the security management 122 network server facility 142and security update module may function substantially the same as thepolicy management facility 112 network server and policy update moduleby providing information to the enterprise facility 102 network and theclient facility in a push or pull method. In an embodiment, the policymanagement facility 112 and the security facility 122 management updatemodules may work in concert to provide information to the enterprisefacility's 102 network and/or client facility for control of applicationexecution. In an embodiment, the policy update module and securityupdate module may be combined into a single update module.

As threats are identified and characterized, the threat managementfacility 100 may create definition updates that may be used to allow thethreat management facility 100 to detect and remediate the latestmalicious software, unwanted applications, configuration and policychanges, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may containthreat identification updates, also referred to as definition files. Adefinition file may be a virus identity file that may includedefinitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity(IDE) definition files may provide information that may identifymalicious code within files, applications, or the like. The definitionfiles may be accessed by security management facility 122 when scanningfiles or applications within the client facility for the determinationof malicious code that may be within the file or application. Thedefinition files may contain a number of commands, definitions, orinstructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In embodiments,the client facility may be updated with new definition filesperiodically to provide the client facility with the most recentmalicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a set timeperiod, may be updated on demand from the client facility, may beupdated on demand from the network, may be updated on a receivedmalicious code alert, or the like. In an embodiment, the client facilitymay request an update to the definition files from an update facility120 within the network, may request updated definition files from acomputing facility external to the network, updated definition files maybe provided to the client facility 114 from within the network,definition files may be provided to the client facility from an externalcomputing facility from an external network, or the like.

In an embodiment, a definition management facility 114 may provide forthe timely updates of definition files information to the network,client facilities, and the like. New and altered malicious code andmalicious applications may be continually created and distributed tonetworks worldwide. The definition files that maintain the definitionsof the malicious code and malicious application information for theprotection of the networks and client facilities may need continualupdating to provide continual defense of the network and client facilityfrom the malicious code and malicious applications. The definition filesmanagement may provide for automatic and manual methods of updating thedefinition files. In embodiments, the network may receive definitionfiles and distribute the definition files to the network clientfacilities, the client facilities may receive the definition filesdirectly, or the network and client facilities may both receive thedefinition files, or the like. In an embodiment, the definition filesmay be updated on a fixed periodic basis, on demand by the networkand/or the client facility, as a result of an alert of a new maliciouscode or malicious application, or the like. In an embodiment, thedefinition files may be released as a supplemental file to an existingdefinition files to provide for rapid updating of the definition files.

In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used toscan an outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted tobe transmitted per the enterprise facility 102 rules and policies. Bychecking outgoing files, the security management facility 122 may beable discover malicious code infected files that were not detected asincoming files as a result of the client facility having been updatedwith either new definition files or policy management facility 112information. The definition files may discover the malicious codeinfected file by having received updates of developing malicious codefrom the administration facility 134, updates from a definition filesprovider, or the like. The policy management facility 112 may discoverthe malicious code infected file by having received new updates from theadministration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide for a way to controlaccess to the enterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, theenterprise facility 102 may want to restrict access to certainapplications, networks, files, printers, servers, databases, or thelike. In addition, the enterprise facility 102 may want to restrict useraccess under certain conditions, such as the user's location, usagehistory, need to know, job position, connection type, time of day,method of authentication, client-system configuration, or the like.Network access rules may be developed by the enterprise facility 102, orpre-packaged by a supplier, and managed by the threat managementfacility 100 in conjunction with the administration facility 134.Network access rules and control may be responsible for determining if aclient facility application should be granted access to a requestednetwork location. The network location may be on the same network as thefacility or may be on another network. In an embodiment, the networkaccess control may verify access rights for client facilities fromwithin the network or may verify access rights of computer facilitiesfrom external networks. When network access for a client facility isdenied, the network access control may send an information file to theclient facility, the information file may contain data or commands thatmay provide instructions for the remedial action facility 128. Theinformation sent by the network access facility 124 control may be adata file. The data file may contain a number of commands, definitions,instructions, or the like to be parsed and acted upon through theremedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by thenetwork access facility 124 control may be a command or command filethat the remedial action facility 128 may access and take action upon.

In an embodiment, the network access rules 124 may provide aninformation store to be accessed by the network access control. Thenetwork access rules facility 124 may include databases such as a blocklist, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptablenetwork site database, an acceptable network site database, a networksite reputation database, or the like of network access locations thatmay or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, thenetwork access rules facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; therule evaluation may parse network access requests and apply the parsedinformation to network access rules. The network access rule facility124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of anenterprise facility's 102 network access policies, such as denyingaccess to certain types of websites, controlling instant messengeraccesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular expressionrule evaluation, or other rule evaluation method for interpreting thenetwork access request and comparing the interpretation to theestablished rules for network access. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request fromthe network access control and may return the rules evaluation to thenetwork access control.

Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rulefacility 124 may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprisefacility 102. The network access rules facility 124 may be maintained bythe network administration facility 134, using network access rulesfacility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administrationfacility 134 may be able to maintain a set of access rules manually byadding rules, changing rules, deleting rules, or the like. Additionally,the administration facility 134 may be able to retrieve predefined rulesets from a provider that may provide a set of rules to be applied to anentire enterprise facility 102. The network administration facility 134may be able to modify the predefined rules as needed for a particularenterprise facility 102 using the network access rules managementfacility 124.

When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat managementfacility 100, the threat management facility 100 may provide for aremedial action facility 128. Remedial action may take a plurality offorms, such as terminating or modifying an ongoing process orinteraction, sending a warning to a client or administration facility134 of an ongoing process or interaction, executing a program orapplication to remediate against a threat or violation, recordinteractions for subsequent evaluation, or the like. Remedial action maybe associated with an application that responds to information that aclient facility network access request has been denied. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may parsethe data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and acton the parsed data file information to determine actions to be taken onan application requesting access to a denied network location. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may accessthe threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action tobe taken on an application requesting access to a denied networklocation. In an embodiment, the information received from the facilitymay be a command or a command file. The remedial action facility maycarry out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file fromthe facility without performing any interpretation of the commands. Inan embodiment, the remedial action facility may interact with thereceived information and may perform various actions on a clientrequesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one ormore of continuing to block all requests to a denied network location, amalicious code scan on the application, a malicious code scan on theclient facility, quarantine of the application, terminating theapplication, isolation of the application, isolation of the clientfacility to a location within the network that restricts network access,blocking a network access port from a client facility, reporting theapplication to an administration facility 134, or the like.

Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threator violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may includemonitoring the enterprise facility 102 network or endpoint devices, suchas by monitoring streaming data through the gateway, across the network,through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection techniquesfacility 130 may include monitoring activity and stored files oncomputing facilities, such as on server facilities 142, desktopcomputers, laptop computers, other mobile computing devices, and thelike. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files,may provide the capability of checking files for stored threats, eitherin the active or passive state. Detection techniques, such as streamingfile management, may provide the capability of checking files receivedat the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. Thismay provide the capability of not allowing a streaming file or portionsof the streaming file containing malicious code from entering the clientfacility, gateway facility, or network. In an embodiment, the streamingfile may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of virusidentities may be used to check each of the blocks of information formalicious code. In an embodiment, any blocks that are not determined tobe clear of malicious code may not be delivered to the client facility,gateway facility, or network.

Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threatsand violations to established policy, may require the ability to testthe system, either at the system level or for a particular computingcomponent. The testing facility 118 may allow the administrationfacility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security configurations ofclient facility computing facilities on a network. The administrationfacility 134 may be able to send test files to a set of client facilitycomputing facilities to test the ability of the client facility todetermine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has beentransmitted, a recording facility may record the actions taken by theclient facility in reaction to the test file. The recording facility mayaggregate the testing information from the client facility and reportthe testing information to the administration facility 134. Theadministration facility 134 may be able to determine the level ofpreparedness of the client facility computing facilities by the reportedinformation. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client facilitycomputing facilities as determined by the administration facility 134;remedial action may be taken by the administration facility 134 or bythe user of the client facility.

The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoingeffort to maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threatmanagement facility 100 in light of continuous generation of new orevolved forms of malware. Threat research may include researchers andanalysts working on known and emerging malware, such as viruses,rootkits a spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing,spam, scams, and the like. In embodiments, through threat research, thethreat management facility 100 may be able to provide swift, globalresponses to the latest threats.

The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include aplurality of networked components, such as client facility, serverfacility 142, administration facility 134, firewall 138, gateway, hubsand routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users, mobileusers, and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computersecurity facility 152, located on a computer's desktop, which mayprovide threat protection to a user, and associated enterprise facility102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer systemthat may source data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or thelike (such as a user's desktop computer as an endpoint computer), afirewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system, a laptop as amobile endpoint computer, a PDA or tablet as a hand-held endpointcomputer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, or the like. Inembodiments, endpoint may refer to a source or destination for data,including such components where the destination is characterized by anevaluation point for data, and where the data may be sent to asubsequent destination after evaluation. The endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may be an application loaded onto the computer platform orcomputer support component, where the application may accommodate theplurality of computer platforms and/or functional requirements of thecomponent. For instance, a client facility computer may be one of aplurality of computer platforms, such as Windows, Macintosh, Linux, andthe like, where the endpoint computer security facility 152 may beadapted to the specific platform, while maintaining a uniform productand product services across platforms. Additionally, components may havedifferent functions to serve within the enterprise facility's 102networked computer-based infrastructure. For instance, computer supportcomponents provided as hubs and routers 148, server facility 142,firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique security applicationsoftware to protect their portion of the system infrastructure, whileproviding an element in an integrated threat management system thatextends out beyond the threat management facility 100 to incorporate allcomputer resources under its protection.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facilitycomputing platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152is adapted. A client facility computing platform may be a computersystem that is able to access a service on another computer, such as aserver facility 142, via a network. This client facility server facility142 model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as aclient facility connecting to an enterprise facility 102 applicationserver facility 142, a web browser client facility connecting to a webserver facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from anInternet 154 service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like.In embodiments, traditional large client facility applications may beswitched to websites, which may increase the browser's role as a clientfacility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent towhich they perform their own processing. For instance, client facilitiesare sometimes classified as a fat client facility or thin clientfacility. The fat client facility, also known as a thick client facilityor rich client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulkof data processing operations itself, and does not necessarily rely onthe server facility 142. The fat client facility may be most common inthe form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may operateindependent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fatclients 144 may include CURI, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, andthe like. Thin clients 144 may offer minimal processing capabilities,for instance, the thin client facility may primarily provide a graphicaluser interface provided by an application server facility 142, which mayperform the bulk of any required data processing. Programmingenvironments for thin clients 144 may include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP,Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and the like. The client facilitymay also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally, butrelying on a server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, thishybrid client facility may provide benefits from both the fat clientfacility type, such as multimedia support and high performance, and thethin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100, and associatedendpoint computer security facility 152, may provide seamless threatprotection to the plurality of clients 144, and client facility types,across the enterprise facility 102.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server facilities142, such as application servers, communications servers, file servers,database servers, proxy servers, mail servers, fax servers, gameservers, web servers, and the like. A server facility 142, which mayalso be referred to as a server facility 142 application, serverfacility 142 operating system, server facility 142 computer, or thelike, may be an application program or operating system that acceptsclient facility connections in order to service requests from clients144. The server facility 142 application may run on the same computer asthe client facility using it, or the server facility 142 and the clientfacility may be running on different computers and communicating acrossthe network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided amongserver facility 142 computers, with the dividing depending upon theworkload. For instance, under light load conditions all server facility142 applications may run on a single computer and under heavy loadconditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiplecomputers. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 mayprovide threat protection to server facilities 142 within the enterprisefacility 102 as load conditions and application changes are made.

A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where theappliance facility 140 provides specific services onto the network.Though the appliance facility 140 is a server facility 142 computer,that may be loaded with a server facility 142 operating system andserver facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user maynot need to configure it, as the configuration may have been performedby a third party. In an embodiment, an enterprise facility 102 appliancemay be a server facility 142 appliance that has been configured andadapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and locatedwithin the facilities of the enterprise facility 102. The enterprisefacility's 102 threat management appliance may enable the enterprisefacility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat protectionconfiguration, where the administration facility 134 may access thethreat resources through an interface, such as a web portal. In someembodiments, the enterprise facility 102 may be managed remotely from athird party, vendor, or the like, without an appliance facility 140located within the enterprise facility 102. In this instance, theappliance functionality may be a shared hardware product betweenpluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliance facility140 may be located at the enterprise facility 102, where the enterprisefacility 102 maintains a degree of control. In embodiments, a hostedservice may be provided, where the appliance 140 may still be an on-siteblack box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placed therebecause of infrastructure requirements, but managed by a third party,vendor, or the like.

Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across theenterprise facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches,routers, wireless routers, hubs and routers, gateways, print servers,net modems, and the like. These simple server facility appliances maynot require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but mayrequire protection from threats via an endpoint computer securityfacility 152. These appliances may provide interconnection serviceswithin the enterprise facility 102 network, and therefore may advancethe spread of a threat if not properly protected.

One way for a client facility to be protected from threats from withinthe enterprise facility 102 network may be a personal firewall. Apersonal firewall may be an application that controls network traffic toand from a client, permitting or denying communications based on asecurity policy. Personal firewalls may be designed for use byend-users, which may result in protection for only the computer on whichit's installed. Personal firewalls may be able to control networktraffic by providing prompts each time a connection is attempted andadapting security policy accordingly. Personal firewalls may alsoprovide some level of intrusion detection, which may allow the softwareto terminate or block connectivity where it suspects an intrusion isbeing attempted. Other features that may be provided by a personalfirewall may include alerts about outgoing connection attempts, controlof program access to networks, hiding the client from port scans by notresponding to unsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applicationsthat may be listening for incoming connections, monitoring andregulation of incoming and outgoing network traffic, prevention ofunwanted network traffic from installed applications, reportingapplications that make connection attempts, reporting destinationservers with which applications may be attempting communications, andthe like. In embodiments, the personal firewall may be provided by thethreat management facility 100.

Another important component that may be protected by an endpointcomputer security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, whichmay be a hardware or software device that may be configured to permit,deny, or proxy data through a computer network that has different levelsof trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal enterprisefacility 102 network may have a high level of trust, because the sourceof all data has been sourced from within the enterprise facility 102. Anexample of a low level of trust is the Internet 154, because the sourceof data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,situated between the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may bereferred to as a “perimeter network.” Since firewall facilities 138represent boundaries between threat levels, the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 mayprovide resources that may control the flow of threats at thisenterprise facility 102 network entry point. Firewall facilities 138,and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also beassociated with a network node that may be equipped for interfacingbetween networks that use different protocols. In embodiments, theendpoint computer security facility 152 may provide threat protection ina plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at theenterprise facility 102 network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility138 or gateway; at the server facility 142; at distribution pointswithin the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the desktop ofclient facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the mosteffective location for threat detection may be at the user's computerdesktop endpoint computer security facility 152.

The interface between the threat management facility 100 and theenterprise facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 toembedded endpoint computer security facilities, may include a set oftools that may be the same for all enterprise implementations, but alloweach enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, thesecontrols may include both automatic actions and managed actions.Automatic actions may include downloads of the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 to components of the enterprise facility 102,downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilitiesof the enterprise facility 102, uploaded network interaction requestsfrom enterprise facility 102 components to the threat managementfacility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactionsbetween the enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility100 may be configured by the threat management facility 100 and anadministration facility 134 in the enterprise facility 102. Theadministration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determineinteractions, such as developing rules for accessing applications, as inwho is authorized and when applications may be used; establishing rulesfor ethical behavior and activities; rules governing the use ofentertainment software such as games, or personal use software such asIM and VoIP; rules for determining access to enterprise facility 102computing resources, including authentication, levels of access, riskassessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when an action is notallowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or justmodified in its execution; and the like. The administration facility 134may also establish license management, which in turn may furtherdetermine interactions associated with a licensed application. Inembodiments, interactions between the threat management facility 100 andthe enterprise facility 102 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102 by managing the flow of network data into andout of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may beconfigured by the threat management facility 100 or the administrationfacility 134.

Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities148A or wireless network facilities 148B. Client facilities connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network via a wired facility 148A orwireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as bothconnection types are ultimately connected to the same enterprisefacility 102 network, with the same endpoint computer security facility152, and the same threat protected enterprise facility 102 environment.Mobile wireless facility clients 144B-F, because of their ability toconnect to any wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to theInternet 154 outside the enterprise facility 102, and therefore outsidethe threat-protected environment of the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144 B-F), if notfor the presence of the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayexperience a malware attack or perform actions counter to enterprisefacility 102 established policies. In addition, there may be a pluralityof ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect theout-of-enterprise facility 102 mobile client facility (e.g., the clients144 D-F) that has an embedded endpoint computer security facility 152,such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a webappliance as a DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that arecomponents of the enterprise facility 102 but temporarily outsideconnectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network may be providedwith the same threat protection and policy control as client facilitiesinside the enterprise facility 102. In addition, mobile the clientfacilities may receive the same interactions to and from the threatmanagement facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprisefacility 102, where the mobile client facilities may be considered avirtual extension of the enterprise facility 102, receiving all the sameservices via their embedded endpoint computer security facility 152.

Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and thecomponents of the enterprise facility 102, including mobile clientfacility extensions of the enterprise facility 102, may ultimately beconnected through the Internet 154. Threat management facility 100downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed fromthe firewalled networks of the threat management facility 100 through tothe endpoint computer security facility 152 equipped components of theenterprise facility 102. In turn the endpoint computer security facility152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload policy andaccess requests back across the Internet 154 and through to the threatmanagement facility 100. The Internet 154 however, is also the paththrough which threats may be transmitted from their source. Thesenetwork threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of sources,including without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, applicationsoftware, and the like. These threats may attempt to attack a mobileenterprise client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F) equipped with anendpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long asthe mobile client facility is embedded with an endpoint computersecurity facility 152, as described above, threats may have no bettersuccess than if the mobile client facility were inside the enterprisefacility 102.

However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect intoan unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108that is not a part of the enterprise facility 102, the mobile clientfacility may be required to request network interactions through thethreat management facility 100, where contacting the threat managementfacility 100 may be performed prior to any other network action. Inembodiments, the client facility's 144 endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may manage actions in unprotected network environments suchas when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a secondarylocation 108 or connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102wireless Internet connection, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed, blocked, modified, orthe like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint computersecurity facility 152 is unable to establish a secured connection to thethreat management facility 100, the endpoint computer security facility152 may inform the user of such, and recommend that the connection notbe made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect despite therecommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may performspecific actions during or after the unprotected connection is made,including running scans during the connection period, running scansafter the connection is terminated, storing interactions for subsequentthreat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management facility100 upon first instance of a secured connection for further actions andor scanning, restricting access to network and local resources, or thelike. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayperform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions orpolicy violations during or after the unprotected connection.

The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer securityfacilities 152 as a part of its computer components, such as itsfirewalls 138B, servers 142B, clients 144G, hubs and routers 148C-D, andthe like. As a result, the computer components of the secondary location108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential sources ofthreats, as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B-F thatmay be connected to the secondary location's 108 network. In thisinstance, these computer components may now unknowingly spread a threatto other components connected to the network.

Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as fromnon-enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physicallybrought into the enterprise facility 102 and connected to the enterprisefacility 102 client facilities. The connection may be made from directconnection with the enterprise facility's 102 client facility, such asthrough a USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprisefacility's 102 client facility such that a wireless facility connectioncan be established, such as through a Bluetooth connection. Thesephysical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, aportable memory storage device, a mobile communications device, or thelike, such as CDs and DVDs, memory sticks, flash drives, external harddrives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, digital cameras, point-to-pointdevices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation devices,tablets, appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 mayhave been previously infiltrated by network threats while connected toan unprotected network connection outside the enterprise facility 102,and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facility, posea threat. Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110may infiltrate computing resources in any location, such as beingphysically brought into the enterprise facility 102 site, connected toan enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client facility ismobile, plugged into an unprotected client facility at a secondarylocation 108, and the like. A mobile device, once connected to anunprotected computer resource, may become a physical proximity threat110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayprovide enterprise facility 102 computing resources with threatprotection against physical proximity threats 110, for instance, throughscanning the device prior to allowing data transfers, through securityvalidation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within theenterprise facility 102 computing resource to transfer data into forevaluation, and the like.

FIG. 2 illustrates a networking system 200. In general, the networkingsystem 200 may include a network device 210 connected to a network 202,e.g., to an external device 204. The network device 210 may be orinclude any type of network endpoint or endpoints as described herein,e.g., with reference to FIG. 1 above. For example, the network device210 may include a desktop computer workstation. The network device 210may also or instead be any suitable device that has processes andcommunicates over a network 202, including without limitation a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet, amobile phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g.,watch, jewelry, or clothing), a home device (e.g., a thermostat or ahome appliance controller), just as some examples. The network device210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be disposed on aserver.

The network device 210 may be used for any of the entities described inthe threat management environment described above with reference toFIG. 1. For example, the network device 210 may be a server, a client anenterprise facility, a threat management facility, or any of the otherfacilities or computing devices described therein. In certain aspects,the network device 210 may be implemented using hardware or acombination of software and hardware, and the network device 210 may bea standalone device, a device integrated into another entity or device,a platform distributed across multiple entities, or a virtualized deviceexecuting in a virtualization environment.

The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., datanetwork(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data andcontrol information among participants in the computer system 200. Thismay include public networks such as the Internet, private networks, andtelecommunications networks such as the Public Switched TelephoneNetwork or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology(e.g., 3G or IMT-2000), fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G,LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA, etc.) or WiMax-Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/orother technologies, as well as any of a variety of corporate area,metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprisenetworks, along with any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the likethat might be used to carry data among participants in the computersystem 200. The network 202 may also include a combination of datanetworks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or privatenetwork.

The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resourcethat connects to the network device 210 through the network 202. Thismay include threat management resources such as any of thosecontemplated above, gateways or other network devices, remote servers orthe like containing content requested by the network device 210, anetwork storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content,or any other resource or device that might connect to the network device210 through the network 202.

The network device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, anetwork interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/outputdevices 220. The network device 210 may further include or be incommunication with peripherals 222 and other external input/outputdevices 224.

The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general becapable of processing instructions for execution within the networkdevice 210 or computer system 200. The processor 212 may include asingle-threaded processor or a multi-threaded processor. The processor212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory 214or on the data store 218.

The memory 214 may store information within the network device 210 orcomputer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile ornon-volatile memory or other computer-readable medium, including withoutlimitation a Random Access Memory (RAM), a flash memory, a Read OnlyMemory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only Memory (PROM), an Erasable PROM(EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may store programinstructions, program data, executables, and other software and datauseful for controlling operation of the computing device 200 andconfiguring the computing device 200 to perform functions for a user.The memory 214 may include a number of different stages and types fordifferent aspects of operation of the network device 210. For example, aprocessor may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster access tocertain data or instructions, and a separate, main memory or the likemay be included to expand memory capacity as desired.

The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer readablemedium containing computer code that, when executed by the computingdevice 200 creates an execution environment for a computer program inquestion, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocolstack, a database management system, an operating system, or acombination of the foregoing, and that performs some or all of the stepsset forth in the various flow charts and other algorithmic descriptionsset forth herein.

The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software forconnecting the network device 210 in a communicating relationship withother resources through the network 202. This may include remoteresources accessible through the Internet, as well as local resourcesavailable using short range communications protocols using, e.g.,physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications(e.g., WiFi), optical communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, orthe like), ultrasonic communications, or any combination of these orother media that might be used to carry data between the network device210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, for example,include a router, a modem, a network card, an infrared transceiver, aradio frequency (RF) transceiver, a near field communications interface,a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag reader, or any other datareading or writing resource or the like.

More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination ofhardware and software suitable for coupling the components of thenetwork device 210 to other computing or communications resources. Byway of example and not limitation, this may include electronics for awired or wireless Ethernet connection operating according to the IEEE802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or longrange wireless networking components or the like. This may includehardware for short range data communications such as Bluetooth or aninfrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other localdevices, or to connect to a local area network or the like that is inturn coupled to a data network 202 such as the Internet. This may alsoor instead include hardware/software for a WiMax connection or acellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any othersuitable protocol or combination of protocols). The network interface216 may be included as part of the input/output devices 220 orvice-versa.

The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing acomputer-readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a flash drive, or other device capable of providing massstorage for the network device 210. The data store 218 may storecomputer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, andother data for the network device 210 or computer system 200 in anon-volatile form for subsequent retrieval and use. For example, thedata store 218 may store without limitation one or more of the operatingsystem, application programs, program data, databases, files, and otherprogram modules or other software objects and the like.

The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output toother devices that might couple to the network device 210. This may, forexample, include serial ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serial bus(USB) ports, optical ports, Ethernet ports, telephone ports, audiojacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so forth, any ofwhich might be used to form wired connections to other local devices.This may also or instead include an infrared interface, RF interface,magnetic card reader, or other input/output system for coupling in acommunicating relationship with other local devices. It will beunderstood that, while the network interface 216 for networkcommunications is described separately from the input/output interface220 for local device communications, these two interfaces may be thesame, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used toattach to a WiFi accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used tocouple to a local network attached storage.

A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information toor receive information from the computing device 200. This may includehuman input/output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mousepad, a track ball, a joystick, a microphone, a foot pedal, a camera, atouch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be employed by theuser 230 to provide input to the network device 210. This may also orinstead include a display, a speaker, a printer, a projector, a headsetor any other audiovisual device for presenting information to a user.The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a digital signalprocessing device, an actuator, or other device to support control orcommunication to other devices or components. Other I/O devices suitablefor use as a peripheral 222 include haptic devices, three-dimensionalrendering systems, augmented-reality displays, and so forth. In oneaspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the network interface 216, suchas with a USB device configured to provide communications via shortrange (e.g., BlueTooth, WiFi, Infrared, RF, or the like) or long range(e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communications protocols. In anotheraspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device to augment operation ofthe network device 210, such as a global positioning system (GPS)device, a security dongle, or the like. In another aspect, theperipheral may be a storage device such as a flash card, USB drive, orother solid state device, or an optical drive, a magnetic drive, a diskdrive, or other device or combination of devices suitable for bulkstorage. More generally, any device or combination of devices suitablefor use with the computing device 200 may be used as a peripheral 222 ascontemplated herein.

Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200such as a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a mathco-processor, a graphics engine, a video driver, and so forth. The otherhardware 226 may also or instead include expanded input/output ports,extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or other accessory),and so forth.

A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanicalplatform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 suchas the processor 212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware226, data store 218, and input/output interface. As shown in the figure,each of the components of the network device 210 may be interconnectedusing a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism forcommunicating information.

Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the processor212 of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences ofinstructions contained in the memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks.In embodiments, the computing device 200 may be deployed as a number ofparallel processors synchronized to execute code together for improvedperformance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in avirtualized environment where software on a hypervisor or othervirtualization management facility emulates components of the computingdevice 200 as appropriate to reproduce some or all of the functions of ahardware instantiation of the computing device 200.

Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the descriptionnow turns to devices, systems, and methods for providing honeypotnetwork services. Honeypot network services may be used as part of, inaddition to, in conjunction with, or to supplement the threat detectiondescribed above. In another aspect, the devices, systems, and methodsfor providing honeypot network services are separate from a threatdetection system such as those described above.

Referring to FIG. 3, in some implementations, a method 300 for detectinga compromised device in a network may include, in block 301, monitoringnetwork activity. Monitoring network activity may be performed, forexample, by a network monitor. The network monitor may be implemented,for example, on a network server or network management device, which mayinclude or may be part of one or more of a threat management facility100, firewall 138A, appliance 140A, server 142A, network device 148A,148B, and/or another device. The network monitor may be part of orincluded in a device that monitors other network activity. The networkmonitor may have physical access to the network and the capability tomonitor traffic on the network. The network monitor may be incommunication with one or more devices that have physical access to thenetwork. The network monitor may track or log the activity of eachdevice on the network or a portion of the network. The network monitormay track or log activity of one or more selected devices on thenetwork.

In some implementations, monitoring network activity may includemonitoring communication between a first device and other devices on thenetwork or in other networks. For example, all devices on a localnetwork may be monitored. For example, a subset of devices on a localnetwork may be monitored. For example, the network may be monitored byrouting all communication through one or more devices, so that the oneor more devices have access to all communication on the network. Thismay be possible, for example, with a switch or router, or a group ofswitches and routers. The network may be monitored by passivelymonitoring all communication on one or more local networks with one ormore network monitors.

In block 302, the method may include detecting network activityindicative of network service discovery, such as port scanning. Here,network service discovery and port scanning are intended to include anytechnique in which attempts are made to connect to network devices todetermine what network services are available. For example, malwarerunning on a compromised device in the network may automatically searchone or more ports on a number of network addresses in a network todetermine whether the address/port presents a network service. Forexample, a request may be made to port 23 at a network address todetermine whether a device at that network address presents a telnetservice. Another request may be made to port 23 at another networkaddress. As another example, a request may be made to port 42 at thatnetwork address to determine whether a device at that network addresspresents a Windows Internet Name Service. A request may be made to port23 at the same network address to determine whether the device at thatnetwork address presents a telnet service. Once a network service hasbeen discovered, malware or an intruder may attempt to use an exploit totake advantage of a security deficiency in a network service to gainunauthorized access to the system.

Detection of network activity indicative of network service discoverymay be accomplished in any suitable manner. In some implementations anetwork monitor tracks requests made by devices to network addresses andports. For example, a request made by a network device to two or threedifferent ports at one network address may be indicative of networkservice discovery. For example, requests made by a network device to thesame or a particular port at multiple network addresses may beindicative of network service discovery, particularly if one or more ofthe network addresses are unassigned. For example, one or more requestsmade outside of expected addresses and ports may be indicative ofnetwork service discovery. In a network where multiple devices arecompromised, or in which a compromised system simulates multiple networkdevices, requests may be, or may appear to be, made by multiple networkdevices, and so detection of network activity indicative of networkservice discovery may take this into account.

Some normal device activity may have similar characteristics to networkservice discovery. For example, some operating systems may attempt todetect printers or file sharing services available on a network, and somay check certain network addresses and ports for print and fileservices. In some implementations, allowed network service discoveryattempts may be detected and exempted from the detection of activityindicative of network service discovery. In this way a typical end userwould not trigger suspicion.

Requests made to a port and network address that are not consistent withthe current network topology may be indicative of network servicediscovery. For example, a request made to an unassigned network address(e.g., an address not assigned to any device) may indicative of networkservice discovery. For example, a request made to a port at a networkaddress that is assigned to a device, but for which the network devicedoes not provide a service at that port may be indicative of networkservice discovery. In some implementations, detecting network activityindicative of network service discovery comprises detecting a firstrequest made to a first port at a first unassigned network address and asecond network request to a second port at a second unassigned networkaddress. The second unassigned network address may be different from thefirst network address.

In some implementations, detecting network activity indicative ofnetwork service discovery comprises detecting a plurality of requests todifferent ports associated with an unassigned network address. In someimplementations, detecting network activity indicative of networkservice discovery comprises detecting a request to a network service ata predetermined port of an unassigned network address.

In some implementations, a network monitor may monitor requests made byor to one or more devices on the network to determine whether therequests are consistent with the network topology as known by thenetwork monitor. For example, the network monitor may have access to alist or database of network devices and services offered by the networkdevices. A request made that is inconsistent with the services offeredmay be indicative of network service discovery. One or more requestsmade by the same device or to the same device that is inconsistent withthe services offered may be indicative of network service discovery. Theservices may be services that are designated as offered by the devicesor services typically offered by devices in a classification to whichthe device is assigned.

In some implementations, a network monitor may have access to a list ordatabase of each device on the network and a classification for thattype of device. The classification may include categories of service(e.g., application server, web server, user device, printer). Theclassification may include a designation of owner (e.g., end user,administrative user, infrastructure device). The classification mayinclude a designation of department (e.g., sales, informationtechnology, accounting). The classification may be used to determineexpected ports for access to the device. Requests to ports outside theexpected ports for that device may be indicative of network servicediscovery. For example, a device classified as a web server may not beexpected to make a HTTP request to a printer. Such a request would beoutside of the expected request types, and so may be indicative ofnetwork service discovery.

In some implementations, a network monitor may track and record requestsmade to devices on the network over time, so as to determine whichrequests to which ports and addresses are typically made. Requests madeto a port/address that are unique and/or are infrequent for a particulardevice or classification of device may be indicative of network servicediscovery. In some implementations, categories of devices are used, sothat requests made by user devices are tracked and requests made byservers are tracked over time. Requests made to a port/address that isoutside of the pattern for the category of device may be indicative ofnetwork service discovery.

In some implementations, a network monitor may be configured to detectaccess patterns in short (e.g., less than 0.25 seconds, less than 0.5seconds, less than 1 second, less than 2 seconds) time intervals. Accessattempts to low (e.g., privileged) ports are weighted higher than highport access attempts. The network monitor may monitor access to networkaddresses on the local network or all network traffic to which thenetwork monitor has access by passively monitoring and processingnetwork traffic on the network.

A network monitor may identify one, two, three, or more network requeststhat may be indicative of network service discovery. For example, if athreshold number of network requests to an unassigned port and/ornetwork address are made, network service discovery may be determined tobe detected.

In some implementations, a score is used to determine whether networkservice discovery is detected. Requests are assigned a score, and if thescore meets a threshold, network service discovery is determined to bedetected. Requests to or from a server within a particular time period(e.g., 1 second, 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute, 30 minutes, 1 hour,12 hours, 1 day, 1 week) may be scored to determine whether the requestsmeet a threshold.

In some implementations, some network requests may be treated as moresuspicious than others, and therefore have a higher weight in the score.For example, requests to frequently-used ports may be less suspiciousthan requests to infrequently used ports, and therefore have a lowerscore. For example, requests to unused network addresses may be moresuspicious than requests to an unused port of an active device, andtherefore have a higher score.

A score may also take into account other considerations, such as a totalnumber of requests, a frequency of requests (e.g., requests within atime period (e.g., 1 second, 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute, 30minutes, 1 hour, 12 hours, 1 day, 1 week), etc.

In some implementations, a categorization of a device may be used todetermine what threshold for requests, or what type of requests willpresent a honeypot network service. For example, if an administrativedevice is known to undertake network service discovery foradministrative or security purposes, that device may be exempted frompresentation, or have a high threshold score. Likewise, if a device isnot expected to have any network requests, or have only a specific typeof network request, all requests may be indicative of network servicediscovery. If a device makes requests outside of historical or anexpected request profile based on device category, such requests may beindicative of network service discovery.

In some implementations, a network monitor may be implemented on asystem using the Linux operating system and netfilter/iptables. Anetfilter extension “psd” attempts to detect port scans. Parameters thatcan be set for psd include: “psd-weight-threshold,” which is the totalweight of the latest TCP/UDP packets with different destination portscoming from the same host to be treated as port scan sequence;“psd-delay-threshold delay,” which is the delay (in hundredths ofsecond) for packets with different destination ports coming from thesame host to be treated as a possible port scan subsequence;“psd-lo-ports-weight,” which sets the weight of the packet with aprivileged (<=1024) destination port; and “psd-hi-ports-weight,” whichsets the weight of a packet with non-privileged destination port. Insome implementations, parameters used for psd are: psd-weight-threshold:21, psd-delay-threshold: 300, psd-lo-ports-weight: 3, and psdhi-ports-weight: 1.

In some implementations, network service discovery is detected when adetection score of 21 points in a time range of 300 ms for oneindividual source IP address is exceeded. The detection score iscalculated as follows: request to a TCP destination port less than 1024:3 points; request to a TCP destination port greater or equal 1024: 1point; request to ports 11, 12, 13, 2000: 10 points.

In block 303, the method may include presenting a honeypot networkservice in response to the detected network activity. A honeypot networkservice may be a simulated, instrumented, monitored, or designatednetwork service that is presented as a target. The honeypot networkservice may have characteristics that make it an attractive target. Forexample, a honeypot network service may present a service with knownvulnerabilities. For example, a honeypot network service may present anetwork service with a security flaw (e.g., no password configured oreasily guessed password). For example, a honeypot network service maypresent as a network service that offers content (e.g., files, data)that may be attractive to an attacker (e.g., financial data).

A honeypot network service may be presented along with one or more otherhoneypot network services, so that there are two or more networkservices presented on different ports of a network address. A honeypotnetwork service or services may be presented so as to present theappearance of a particular honeypot device. For example, a collection ofhoneypot network services may be presented so as to give the impressionof a particular type of device. For example, a web application servermay be expect to present services on ports 22, 80, and 8080, honeypotnetwork services may be presented on ports 22, 80, and 8080. Forexample, in some implementations, ports presented as honeypot networkservices may include well-known privileged ports for HTTP/HTTPS (TCP:80, 8080, 443), SMB (UDP: 137-137, TCP: 445), FTP (TCP: 21), SMTP (TCP:25, 587, 465), IMAP (TCP: 143, 993) as well as others.

The honeypot network service(s) presented may be selected based on thehoneypot network services that are available. For example, in someimplementations, a number of honeypot network service are configured ina network device, and all or a subset (including only 1) of the honeypotnetwork services may be presented at a network address. In someimplementations, a set of one or more network services may be selectedto present, for example to simulate a type of network device (e.g., anapplication server, a user device, etc.). In some implementations, asuspected network device makes a request to a port on a network address,and the honeypot network service(s) may be selected so as to present aservice at that port.

In some implementations, a honeypot network service may be presented atmultiple addresses and/or ports on a network. For example, a networkmonitor may configure the honeypot network service to be presented onmore than port and/or address. This may provide more potential targetsfor a compromised device to pursue. There may be different honeypotnetwork services presented on different ports/address, or the samehoneypot network service may be presented to different ports/addresses.

In some implementations, the honeypot network service may be presentedby simulating a network service. The network monitor or another devicemay be configured to respond to requests at a particular port andaddress. The simulation of the network service may be such that therewould appear to be a vulnerability or particular data presented, but theactual service provided may be fictional or limited in scope. Thehoneypot network service may appear to have access to data, but in factthe data may not be available, or may also be simulated or fictional.The data available to the honeypot network service may be simulated ortest data that appears to be attractive.

In some implementations, one or more honeypot network services may beselected to give the appearance of an application server with aparticular operating system and network services, and the honeypotnetwork service may be configured to present itself at a particular portand network address to simulate such an application server.

In some implementations, a honeypot network service (whether or notsimulated) is configured to present at a first port and/or networkaddress (which may or may not be available to network devices generallyor to a suspected network device), and a network device is configured soas to present the honeypot network service instead or in addition at asecond port and/or network address. For example, requests made to anotherwise unallocated network port or address may be forwarded to ahoneypot network service. This may be accomplished, for example, withNetwork Address Translation (NAT). In this way, a honeypot networkservice may be presented at one or more other addresses or ports withoutrequiring changes to the honeypot network service. A network monitor maycause a honeypot network service to be presented by configuring anetwork switch or router to forward network traffic to/from a desirednetwork address and port to the network device that is providing thehoneypot network service.

In some implementations, a honeypot network service may be presented toonly one or a limited number of devices on the network. For example, ifpresenting the honeypot network service is triggered by a request orrequests from one potentially compromised device, the honeypot networkservice may be presented only to that device. This may be accomplishedby only forwarding requests from that one suspected device to thehoneypot network service. By selectively presenting the honeypot networkservice only to a suspected device or devices, other network devicesremain unaffected. If there are a number of suspected devices, each ofthem may be directed to the same honeypot network service. Eachsuspected device may have access to a honeypot network service madeavailable to that device at different address.

In some implementations, the address/port on which the honeypot networkservice is presented is randomly assigned among a group of unassignednetwork addresses. In some implementations, the address/port on whichthe honeypot network service is presented is assigned based on theactivity indicative of network discovery. The address/port on which thehoneypot network service is presented may be the designated port for thehoneypot network service at the address that is apparently beingtargeted.

For example, a network monitor may detect network activity indicative ofnetwork service discovery at a particular network address by a suspectednetwork device, and in response configures a network device to present ahoneypot network service at that network address. For example, thenetwork monitor detects port scanning at 10.1.2.144. The network monitorthen causes a honeypot network service to be presented on port 8080 ataddress 10.1.2.144 by configuring routing tables (e.g., network addresstranslation) to forward requests made by the suspected device to10.1.2.144 to the address of the honeypot network service. Theforwarding should be transparent to the network device initiating thenetwork request.

In some implementations the address/port on which the honeypot networkservice is presented may be the designated port for the honeypot networkservice at one or more addresses that are near the suspected activity.For example, if the network monitor detects port scanning at 10.1.2.144,and network addresses 10.1.2.143, 10.1.2.145, and 10.1.2.146 areunassigned, the network monitor then causes a honeypot network serviceto be presented on port 8080 at address 10.1.2.143, 10.1.2.145, and10.1.2.146 in the hopes that the suspected device will look at thoseaddresses next.

In some implementations, the same honeypot network service may bepresented on a number of previously unassigned network addresses. Forexample, a honeypot network service may be presented at address10.1.1.44:23, 10.1.2.45:23, 10.1.1.86:23, and 10.1.1.199:23. There maybe any number of addresses and ports that are forwarded to the honeypotnetwork service. There may a large number of addresses and ports thatare forwarded to the honeypot network service, to seem to fill thenetwork with a large number of potential targets. If these addresseswere previously unassigned, there may be no impact on the other deviceson the network, particularly if the honeypot network service is onlymade available to suspected devices. Making the honeypot network serviceavailable on multiple addresses may help a compromised device to findthe honeypot network service faster, and thus convict the device faster.

Once presented, a honeypot network service may be presented for apredetermined period of time, (e.g., 5 minutes, 15 minutes, 30 minutes,1 hour, 2 hours, 5 hours, 10 hours, 24 hours, 48 hours, 1 week, 2weeks). Presenting honeypot network services is relatively inexpensive,and unlikely to disturb normal operation of the network if presentedonly to suspected network devices (e.g., devices that trigger thepresentation of honeypot network services). It is possible that anattacker may conduct network service discovery, and then return afterevaluating results of network service discovery to plan an attack. Insome implementations, the time period for presenting the honeypotnetwork service is determined based on the network service discoverydetection. Activity more likely to be indicative of network servicediscovery results in a longer time for honeypot presentation. Forexample, in some implementations, a higher detection score results in alonger presentation time. In block 304, the method may includemonitoring communication between one or more devices on the network andthe honeypot network service. In some implementations, a network monitormay monitor network traffic between a network device and the honeypotnetwork service. In some implementations, a honeypot network service maybe instrumented to provide information about interaction with thehoneypot network service. For example, a monitor implemented as part ofthe honeypot network service may monitor interaction with the honeypotnetwork service. In some implementations, a honeypot network service maybe configured to forward all communication from a device to a networkmonitor. In some implementations, a honeypot network service may beconfigured to communicate a convict decision to a network monitor orthreat management facility.

In some implementations, network communication with the honeypot networkservice extends the time period that the honeypot network service ispresented to a network device. If a network device engages incommunication with the honeypot network service, the presentation of thehoneypot network service may be extended for a period of time (e.g., 1week, 2 weeks, 1 month) or indefinitely until cleared by anadministrator.

In block 305, the method may include determining that a device iscompromised based on the communication with the honeypot networkservice. In some implementations, the honeypot network service includesfunctionality to determine whether interaction with the honeypot networkservice may be indicative of compromise. For example, if a deviceattempts to authenticate to the honeypot network service or if a deviceattempts to exploit the honeypot network service, a determination ofcompromise of the initiating device may be made.

For example, a network monitor may determine whether a device determinedto have activity indicative of network service discovery attempts tointeract with the honeypot network service. The type of interaction maybe indicative of compromise. Given that the honeypot network service isnot used for regular business purposes, it is unlikely that any devicewould have business need to interact with the honeypot network service,and so it may be that any interaction after discovery by a networkdevice of the honeypot network service may be indicative of compromise.In some cases, it may be that certain interaction on certain ports maybe tolerated before compromise is determined. In some implementations,if data is sought or downloaded, that would be indicative of compromise,and so would be sufficient to convict. In some implementations, if anapparent exploit is initiated, it would be indicative of compromise.

In some implementations, any interaction with the honeypot networkservice may be sufficient for conviction. In some implementations,conviction is ordered by the severity of interaction, and a thresholdlevel of severity must be met in order to convict. For example,interaction in order of least to greatest severity may be:

1. A connection attempt (successful or unsuccessful) to a single port(possible “banner grabbing”).

2. A request to one or more other ports of the network address on whichthe honeypot network service is presented (e.g., port scan or serviceenumeration by an attacker). Depending on configuration, this may bedetected by a network monitor rather than the network device providingthe honeypot network service. This may also result in other honeypotnetwork services being made available.

3. Interaction with a honeypot service on the service protocol level(e.g., ftp login as anonymous, ldap connect).

4. Authentication attempt (e.g., ldap bind, ftp name command).

5. Information gathering (e.g., directory listing commands, directorytraversal commands).

6. Data retrieval (e.g., file retrieval commands).

In some implementations, interaction at a lower level of severity may betolerated by a honeypot network service, and only interaction at ahigher level (e.g., interaction with a honeypot service or more may besufficient to convict.

In some implementations, device communication with the honeypot isscored, and a score that meets the threshold is determined to beindicative of compromise.

In block 306, the method includes protecting the network fromcompromise. For example, in some implementations, an alert may becommunicated with information regarding the determination of compromise.For example, a message may be sent to a threat protection facility withinformation about the compromised device and/or including additionalinformation about the network activity and/or monitored communication.The threat protection facility may take additional steps to protect thenetwork.

In some implementations, a device determined to be compromised may beisolated from the network. For example, in some implementations,networking servers and/or equipment may be configured to block networkcommunication from the device. For example, network switches may benotified not to communicate traffic from the compromised device. Forexample, wifi access points may be configured to block a connection orto block traffic to and from the network device. For example, thephysical layer network address (e.g., MAC address) may be blocked fromwireless access to the network. In some implementations, a device mayhave multiple physical network addresses based on having differentinterfaces (e.g., wired network interface, wireless network interface).In some implementations, when a network device is convicted, all of thenetwork addresses for the device are placed on a “black list” so thatthe network device cannot connect to the network using a wired networkor a wireless network. In some implementations, if the network device isrecognized as belonging to the network, communication from all of thenetwork interfaces of the network device may be allowed but restrictedto communication with the threat management facility, so that thecompromise may be addressed.

In some implementations, when a network device is convicted, users ofthe convicted network device are blocked from access to the network, orto certain resources. For example, users of the network device in a timeperiod (e.g., users within the past week, past month, past 3 months) maybe blocked from access until authentication credentials are reset, incase that user's credentials have been compromised.

In some implementations, an agent running on or with access to thedevice determined to be compromised may be directed to protect thenetwork. For example, an agent on a device determined to be compromisedmay be directed to prevent network communications to and from thenetwork device. For example, an agent on a device determined to becompromised may be directed to disable network communications on thenetwork device. In some implementations, the all communications may bedisabled except for communication with a threat management facility. Anagent on a device determined to be compromised may be directed toconduct a scan or take other measures to identify the source ofcompromise.

In some implementations, an agent on a device determined to becompromised may be directed to identify the process or processes and/orthe application that initiated communication with the honeypot networkservice. For example, while the honeypot network service is operating,an agent operating on the device determined to be compromised may bedirected to monitor network traffic to and from the honeypot networkservice. The agent may then identify the process or application that iscommunicating with the honeypot network service. Once the process orapplication is identified, steps to address the compromise may be takenautomatically (e.g., by pausing or otherwise stopping the process,uninstalling or otherwise isolating the application, notifying the useror administrator, canceling or blocking resources available to theprocess and/or application). A user or administrator may be notified totake manual steps.

Referring to FIG. 4, an exemplary computer network 400 includes one ormore user devices 410, 411, and 412. Each user device 410, 411, 412 maybe a device that uses the network for typical user activities, such as adesktop computer, laptop computer, mobile device, table, PDA, cellphone,tablet or another device. It should be understood that the number ofuser devices 410, 411, 412 shown is exemplary, and there may be anynumber of user devices 410, 411, 412, or no user devices 410, 411, 412.Each user device 410, 411, 412 may be a client device 144 of FIG. 1 oranother device.

One of the user devices 412 includes an agent 413. One or more of theuser devices 410, 411, 412 may include an agent, such as agent 413. Theagent 413 may be any suitable agent that may be used as described here,for example to protect a device or a computer network. The agent 413 maybe part of an operating system or an additional component installed onthe user device 412. The agent 413 may be part of a security systeminstalled on the user device 412. The agent 413 may receive instructionsfrom another device on the network 400, such as a threat managementfacility.

Devices on the network 400, such as user devices 410, 411, 412, maycommunicate with a network device 415 over the network. Network device415 is shown as a gateway to the Internet 416, however it is notnecessary for the network device 415 to be a gateway to the internet orto other networks. The network device 415 may be a server 142, firewall138, or appliance 140 as in FIG. 1, a unified threat management device,a web and/or email gateway, an access point (e.g., a wireless accesspoint), a switch, a router, a passive network device, or even a userdevice 410, 411, 412 or a server 401, 402, 403, 409, or some portion orcombination.

The network device 415 may include or include, may be part of, and/ormay be in communication with a threat management facility 100 (FIG. 1).In some implementations, the network device 415 is implemented as aserver-class computer with unified threat management capability.

A network device 415 includes a network monitor (M) 417. The networkmonitor 417 monitors network communication, and is able to monitornetwork requests made by devices on the network to other devices on thenetwork 400. The network device 415 also may monitor communicationbetween devices on the network 400 and devices located outside thenetwork via the Internet 416. The network monitor 417 may be a componentof the network device 415 that has physical access to the network 400.The network monitor 417 uses a network interface that is configured topresent all network traffic to the network monitor 417. In someimplementations, the network monitor is implemented as a stand-aloneappliance or server. In some implementations, the network monitor is incommunication with other network devices to monitor traffic throughoutthe network. In some implementations, the network monitor is incommunication with agents, such as agent 413, on user devices 410, 411,412, and receives information about network requests from the agents(e.g., agent 413).

In some implementations, a network monitor detects network servicediscovery by monitoring requests from devices on the network. Asdescribed herein, the network monitor may use one or more of a varietyof techniques to detect network activity indicative of network servicediscovery.

In an example implementation, network service discovery is detected whena device makes a request to two unassigned web address/ports within apredetermined time interval, in this case, 1 second.

The network includes one or more servers 401, 402, 403, 409. The servers401, 402, 403, 409 may be any type of servers, such as applicationservers, web servers, email servers, etc. It should be understood thatthe number of servers 401, 402, 403, 409 shown is exemplary, and theremay be any number of servers 401, 402, 403, 409, or no servers 401, 402,403, 409, Servers 401, 402, 403, 409 may be used to provide services toclients on the network 400.

As shown, server 409 provides honeypot network services. In thisimplementation, server 409 provides a web server that is used as ahoneypot network service. In this example, server 409 does not providehoneypot network services until it is directed to do so by the networkmonitor 417.

In this example, user device 410 is determined to initiate networkcommunication indicative of network service discovery. In this example,user device 410 makes two requests to unassigned network addresseswithin a period of 1 second. The network monitor 417 detects thiscommunication from user device 410 and determines that the behavior isindicative of network service discovery. The network monitor 417 thendirects a router 419 and server 509 to present a honeypot networkservice from server 409 to user device 410.

In this implementation, router 419 is included in network device 415. Itshould be understood that the router 419 may be a separate networkdevice, or incorporated into another network device.

In this example, the network monitor 417 directs the router 419 to usenetwork address translation (NAT) to forward requests made to one ormore addresses that are unassigned and that are the target of requestsby the suspected network device 410 or are near the addresses were thetarget of requests by the suspected network device 410. In this way, thehoneypot network services that were not previously accessible to thefirst device prior to the presenting are now available at addresses thatthe suspected network device 410 is likely to access. It may be that theserver 409 is not aware of what addresses the services are presented.The server 409 monitors activity on the honeypot network services, andnotifies a threat management facility if communication is indicative ofcompromise.

In some implementations, the server 409 itself may be able to providehoneypot network services 451 as a “virtual” honeypot 451, at one ormore network addresses in addition to or instead of the address ofserver 409 without needing network address translation provided bynetwork device 415. For example, the server 409 may have multiplenetwork interfaces (physical or virtual) that allow it to presenthoneypot network services at previously unassigned network addresses.The server 409 may include a router or be in communication with a routerfor the network 400. In this way the server 409 can be targeted to thenetwork or portion of the network that the compromised user device 410apparently is investigating without requiring cooperation of anothernetwork device such as router 419. The server 409 may receive a requestfrom the network monitor 417 to present a honeypot network service atone or more unassigned addresses, and the server 409 responds bypresenting honeypot network services as appropriate and possible.

In some implementations, the network monitor 417 communicates to theserver 409 the address of a suspected network device and theaddress/port of the suspected requests made by the suspected networkdevice. Based on information communicated by the network monitor 417,the server 409 determines what addresses to present the honeypot networkservices to the suspected device by configuring its network interfaces,network address translation, or both.

In some implementations, the network device 415 may be used to forwardtraffic from a previously unassigned network address to the server 409.In this way the server 409 does not need to do anything, and the networkdevice 415 controls the presentation of honeypot network services 451.In some implementations, the server 409 that provides honeypot networkservices is on another network that is accessible by the network device415. The network device 415 then forwards traffic directed to anunassigned network address to a network device.

In some implementations, when network activity indicative of networkservice discovery is determined, each subsequent request by thepotentially compromised device to an unassigned network address isforwarded by the network device 415 to a honeypot network service 451.In this way, the network device 415 and the honeypot network service maydetermine quickly whether the requests to unassigned addresses are dueto a compromised device.

In some implementations, the network device 415 may be a wireless accesspoint (e.g., a WiFi access point, cellular access point, etc.). Networkrequests directed to other network devices connected wirelessly to thewireless access point may be indicative of network discovery. Forexample, network requests made to ports of other network devicesconnected wirelessly may be indicative of network discovery. In somecases, network devices connected to a wireless access point typicallyrequest services from wired network resources or network resourcesaccessible over the internet. In some implementations, honeypot networkservices may be configured to present as another wireless device. Insome implementations, upon conviction, the WiFi access point may blockthe convicted network device from connecting to the wireless network,for example by blocking wireless network connections. In someimplementations, upon conviction, the WiFi access point may allowconnection from the convicted network device but block all or a subsetof network communication with the convicted network device. For example,the WiFi access point may allow connection to the internet, but blockcommunication with local network devices. For example, the WiFi accessmay allow communication only with a threat management system so that thethreat management system can remediate a compromise.

Referring to FIG. 5, an exemplary list of network addresses for thenetwork of FIG. 4 shows in row 501 that the network address of server401 is 10.1.1.1. In row 502, the network address of server 402 is shownas 10.1.1.2, and in row 503 the network address of server 403 is shownas 10.1.1.3. The servers 401, 402, and 403 are each presenting serviceson ports 23, 48, 80, and 8080.

In row 509, the network address of web server 409 is 10.1.1.9. The webserver 409 is offering services on ports 80 and 8080.

In row 520, the network address of user device 410 is 10.1.1.20. In row521, the network address of user device 411 is 10.1.1.21. In row 522,the network address of user device 412 is 10.1.1.22.

In row 531, the network address of printer 421 is 10.1.1.31. In row 532,the network address of printer 422 is 10.1.1.32. In row 533, the networkaddress of printer 423 is 10.1.1.33.

The remaining network addresses shown are unassigned.

Referring to FIG. 6, a log of network requests demonstrates an exampleusing the network of FIG. 4 and the example network addresses of FIG. 5.

At entry 601, a request from 10.1.1.20:10300 (the format networkaddress:port means network address 10.1.1.20 and port 10300) to10.1.1.2:80 is observed, which is a HTTP request from user device 410 toserver 402. This does not appear to be suspicious activity.

At entry 602, a request from 10.1.1.21:13200 to 10.1.1.3:80 is observed,which is HTTP request from user device 411 to server 403. This does notappear to be suspicious activity.

At entry 603, a request from 10.1.1.20:10301 to 10.1.1.2:80 is observed,which is a HTTP request from user device 410 to server 402. This doesnot appear to be suspicious activity.

At entry 604, a request from 10.1.1.21:13201 to 10.1.1.23:23 isobserved, which is a request from user device 411 to an unassignedaddress. This is one request to an unassigned address.

At entry 605, a request from 10.1.1.21:13201 to 10.1.1.23:28 isobserved, which is a second request from user device 411 to anunassigned address. In this example, the network monitor determines thatdevice 10.1.1.21 is suspicious. The network monitor directs honeypotnetwork services to be presented, and honeypot network services arepresented on 10.1.1.23. Communication with the honeypot network servicesat 10.1.1.23 are observed.

At entry 606, a request from 10.1.1.20:10300 to 10.1.1.2:80 is observed,which is a HTTP request from user device 410 to server 402. This doesnot appear to be suspicious activity.

At entry 607, a request from 10.1.1.21:13201 to 10.1.1.23:80 isobserved, which is a HTTP request from user device 411 to the honeypotnetwork service. The suspected compromised server presumably now knowsthat the honeypot network service is available.

At entry 608, a second request from 10.1.1.21:130201 to 10.1.1.23:80 isobserved, in which user device 411 attempts to explore the informationavailable at the server. The request may be, for example, an HTTPrequest for information on the honeypot network service presented atport 80.

Based on this activity, the user device at 10.1.1.21 is convicted,meaning that it is determined to be compromised. Steps are then taken toaddress the compromise, and protection of the network initiated.

Referring to FIG. 7, in some implementations, a simulated honeypotnetwork service 701 includes a TCP server 705, a protocol handler 710,and a conviction handler 715. Each of the TCP server 705, protocolhandler 710, and conviction handler 715 are implemented as softwaremodules on a network protection appliance. The appliance may use thearchitecture as described with respect to FIG. 2.

The TCP server 705 includes a list of service ports, shown as serviceports 21, 80, 443, 445, and others. It should be understood that theseports are for one implementation, and other ports may be used. For eachof the ports, a socket is created and added to a socket list. The TCPserver 705 then listens on the port associated with each socket, anddirect requests to one of the protocol handlers 710. In this example,requests to port 21 are directed to a ftp handler, and requests to port80 and 443 are directed to a http handler. Protocol handlers 710 areconfigured for each honeypot network service. As shown, there areprotocol handlers 710 for ftp, http, smb, and smtp. Again, it should beunderstood that these protocols for this implementation, and otherhandlers may be used. The protocol handlers may be worker threads orchild processes that implement the protocol stubs.

In this implementation, some well-known privileged ports for HTTP/HTTPS(TCP: 80, 8080, 443), SMB (UDP: 137-137, TCP: 445), FTP (TCP: 21), SMTP(TCP: 25, 587, 465), and IMAP (TCP: 143, 993) are implemented. In someimplementations, only basic protocol implementations may be needed. Forexample, for FTP and SMB protocols, the file listing commands may beimplemented, and if a target device accesses the service and requests afile list, that may be sufficient to convict. For HTTP and HTTPSprotocols, access or return of a directory listing and a get request onone of the files may be sufficient to convict. For SMTP and IMAPprotocols, protocol level access may be sufficient to convict. Forexample, a banner can be served, and access sufficient to convict.

In some implementations, files with specific content may be provided.The specific content may be detected, for example, by an intrusiondetection system or data loss prevention system. This may be helpful inunderstanding attack patterns and techniques used by an intruder totransfer files from the network.

In some implementations, honeypot network services 705 are running on anetwork device and waiting for incoming connections. A router (e.g.,firewall, gateway, network device 415, or other device) has a rule inplace that initially doesn't forward any connection attempts to thehoneypot network services, so that they are hidden from the network. Therouter may have a rule in place so that only suspicious hosts aredirected to the honeypot network services. For example, with netfilter,the rule might be: “suspicious_hosts->honey_pot_IP: ALLOW.”

Port scan detection by a network monitor may result in an assignment ofa network device to the “suspicious hosts” set. For example, port-scandetection may be a condition for another router rule to add a networkaddress to the “suspicious_hosts” IPSET. Once the suspicious networkdevice is added to the “suspicious_hosts” IPSET, the suspicious networkdevice will have access to the honeypot network services.

With iptables, IPSET entries have a configurable time-to-live (TTL). Bysetting the time-to-live, access to the honeypot network services may beconfigured when the network device is added to the IPSET. In thisexample, the time-to-live is set to 36 hours.

An additional address or addresses may then be forwarded to the addressof the honeypot network services, again only for members of thesuspicious_hosts list. In this way, the honeypot network service may bequickly provisioned for a given suspicious network device.

In an aspect, a computer program product comprising non-transitorycomputer executable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readablemedium that, when executing on one or more computing devices, performsany or all of the steps discussed above.

The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may berealized in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable fora particular application. The hardware may include a general-purposecomputer and/or dedicated computing device. This includes realization inone or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, embeddedmicrocontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or otherprogrammable devices or processing circuitry, along with internal and/orexternal memory. This may also, or instead, include one or moreapplication specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays,programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices thatmay be configured to process electronic signals. It will further beappreciated that a realization of the processes or devices describedabove may include computer-executable code created using a structuredprogramming language such as C, an object oriented programming languagesuch as C++, or any other high-level or low-level programming language(including assembly languages, hardware description languages, anddatabase programming languages and technologies) that may be stored,compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as well asheterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, orcombinations of different hardware and software. In another aspect, themethods may be embodied in systems that perform the steps thereof, andmay be distributed across devices in a number of ways. At the same time,processing may be distributed across devices such as the various systemsdescribed above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into adedicated, standalone device or other hardware. In another aspect, meansfor performing the steps associated with the processes described abovemay include any of the hardware and/or software described above. Allsuch permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scopeof the present disclosure.

Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program productscomprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs any and/or all ofthe steps thereof. The code may be stored in a non-transitory fashion ina computer memory, which may be a memory from which the program executes(such as random access memory associated with a processor), or a storagedevice such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared or other device or combination ofdevices. In another aspect, any of the systems and methods describedabove may be embodied in any suitable transmission or propagation mediumcarrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs fromsame.

It will be appreciated that the devices, systems, and methods describedabove are set forth by way of example and not of limitation. Absent anexplicit indication to the contrary, the disclosed steps may bemodified, supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without departingfrom the scope of this disclosure. Numerous variations, additions,omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one of ordinaryskill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation of method stepsin the description and drawings above is not intended to require thisorder of performing the recited steps unless a particular order isexpressly required or otherwise clear from the context.

The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended toinclude any suitable method of causing such method steps to beperformed, consistent with the patentability of the following claims,unless a different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear fromthe context. So for example performing the step of X includes anysuitable method for causing another party such as a remote user, aremote processing resource (e.g., a server or cloud computer) or amachine to perform the step of X. Similarly, performing steps X, Y and Zmay include any method of directing or controlling any combination ofsuch other individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z toobtain the benefit of such steps. Thus method steps of theimplementations described herein are intended to include any suitablemethod of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform thesteps, consistent with the patentability of the following claims, unlessa different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear from thecontext. Such parties or entities need not be under the direction orcontrol of any other party or entity, and need not be located within aparticular jurisdiction.

It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above areset forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations,additions, omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation ofmethod steps in the description and drawings above is not intended torequire this order of performing the recited steps unless a particularorder is expressly required or otherwise clear from the context. Thus,while particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various changes andmodifications in form and details may be made therein without departingfrom the spirit and scope of this disclosure and are intended to form apart of the invention as defined by the following claims, which are tobe interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.

What is claimed is:
 1. A non-transitory computer-readable mediumcomprising instructions executable by a processor for detecting acompromised device on a network, the instructions when executed causingthe processor to perform steps, comprising: monitor network activity;detect network activity indicative of network service discovery by afirst device, the activity comprising characteristics of port scanning;present a honeypot network service to the first device in response todetecting the activity indicative of network service discovery byredirecting for a limited period of time traffic directed to anunassigned network address to a honeypot network service; monitorcommunication between the first device and the presented honeypotnetwork service to determine whether the monitored communication isindicative of compromise; determine that the first device is compromisedbased on the monitored communication between the first device and thepresented honeypot network service; and initiate measures to protect thenetwork from the compromised first device.
 2. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the measures initiatedcomprise isolating communication from the first device from the network.3. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1, wherein themeasures initiated comprise notifying a threat detection facility. 4.The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1, wherein themeasures initiated comprise generating an alert about the compromisedfirst device.
 5. A method for detecting a compromised device on anetwork, the method comprising: detecting network activity indicative ofnetwork service discovery by a first device; presenting a networkservice to the first device in response to detecting the activityindicative of network service discovery; monitoring communicationbetween the first device and the presented network service; determiningthat the first device is compromised based on the monitoredcommunication between the first device and the presented networkservice; and protecting the network from the compromised first device.6. The method of claim 5, wherein the presented network service was notaccessible to the first device prior to the presenting.
 7. The method ofclaim 5, wherein the network service is a honeypot network service. 8.The method of claim 5, wherein the network service is presented bymaking the network service available at a previously unassigned networkaddress.
 9. The method of claim 5, wherein the network service ispresented by forwarding traffic directed to an unassigned networkaddress to a network device.
 10. The method of claim 5, wherein theactivity indicative of network service discovery comprises portscanning.
 11. The method of claim 5, wherein detecting network activityindicative of network service discovery comprises detecting a request toa network service at an unassigned network address.
 12. The method ofclaim 11, wherein detecting network activity indicative of networkservice discovery comprises detecting a plurality of requests to anetwork service at different ports associated with an unassigned networkaddress.
 13. The method of claim 11, wherein the request to the networkservice is made to a predetermined port of an unassigned networkaddress.
 14. The method of claim 13, further comprising detecting asecond network request to a second port at a different unassignednetwork address.
 15. A system for detecting a compromised device, thesystem comprising: a processor; a memory comprising instructionsexecutable by the processor, the instructions when executed causing theprocessor to perform steps, comprising: detect network activityindicative of port scanning by a first device by detecting a firstnetwork request to a first port associated with an unassigned networkaddress and a second network request to a second port at the unassignednetwork address; present a network service to the first device inresponse to detecting the activity indicative of network servicediscovery; monitor communication between the first device and thepresented network service; determine that the first device iscompromised based on the monitored communication between the firstdevice and the presented network service; and protect the network fromthe compromised first device.
 16. The system of claim 15, wherein theinstructions cause the processor to protect the network by causing theprocessor to prevent communication from the first device to the network.17. The system of claim 15, wherein the instructions cause the processorto protect the network by notifying a threat detection facility that thefirst device is compromised.
 18. The system of claim 15, wherein theinstructions cause the processor to protect the network by identifying aprocess on the first device that generated the detected networkactivity.
 19. The system of claim 18, wherein the instructions cause theprocessor to protect the network by terminating the process on the firstdevice that generated the detected network activity.
 20. The system ofclaim 18, wherein the instructions cause the processor to protect thenetwork by isolating the process on the first device that generated thedetected network activity.